106mm Recoilless RifleThe following links of a presentation on "Hezbollah and the Next War with Israel" by veteran Middle East reporter Nicholas Blanford were forwarded by Irregular RSR with this comment:
It's a lot of material and rather dry, but it discusses Hezbollah strategy, planning and tactics for warfare with Israel. Possible lessons for other local units when faced with a potentially superior force (numbers and technology) deploying from "elsewhere". . . The part that surprised me was the mention of a well-prepared, trained village militia unit that held out against the IDF after 34 days of combat.
For me, the most interesting part came almost at the end where he talks about the use of "obsolete" weapons like the 106mm recoilless rifle against Israeli armor in innovative ways.
Mike
III
Part One.
Part Two.
Part Three.
Part Four.
Part Five.
Part Six.
Part Seven.
8 comments:
I don't want to be seen as a troll nor am I trying to instigate anything...but, I do have one serious question: Being a Three Percenter is about defending the Republic...correct?....what does Israel have to do with defending our Republic? Why links to articles and comments of a "pro-Israel" nature? I consider myself a patriot to the Republic and defender of the Constitution...but, I couldn't give a rat's behind about Israel.
As a former USMC 0351 Anti-tank Assaultman in the early 1970's, I can tell you it may be considered obsolete by the new generation, but just like the M-14 I also carried,, it will blow big fucking holes in things. Bunkers, tanks, vehicles, buildings, people, whatever, it kills shit dead. We could use some old fashioned weapons like this again. I carried a M-79 in 2nd Recon and when the M-203 came out, we hated it. The M-79 was suddenly old stuff that was no longer any good, but those of us who knew how to use one sure could hit with them. The 106rrifle is the same thing, old technology because someone wanted to sell us a new and improved rocket launcher. Compare my old 3.5" bazooka with a LAAW, the 3.5 did all that was asked of it. Somebody just wanted to sell us something new. These older weapons work just fine, you just need to find someone to run them, preferably not some techno geek with a laptop.
Did I mention all these old weapons work just fine when the satellites no longer work.
Semper Fi, 0351,0321,1811,2111
His opening statements about the extent of the underground complexes built by Hezbollah should come as no surprise to anyone that has studied Eastern military SOP's. Case in point; The Cu Chi district in then South Vietnam. The Cu Chi Tunnels consisted of more than 200km of underground tunnels.
Cu Chi District is known worldwide as the base where the Vietnamese mounted their operations of the Tet Offensive in 1968. The upper soil layer is between 3 to 4m thick and can support the weight of a 50-ton tank and the damage of light cannons and bombs. The underground network provided sleeping quarters, meeting rooms, hospitals, and other social rooms.
The Cu Chi Tunnels have carved themselves a celebrated niche in the history of guerrilla warfare – something which we Americans eventually found as much to our embarrassment as to our detriment. They were dug, before the American War, in the late 1940s, as a peasant-army response to a more mobile and ruthless French occupation. The plan was simple: take the resistance briefly to the enemy and then, literally, vanish.
First the French, then the Americans were baffled as to where they melted to, presuming, that it was somewhere under cover of the night in the Cuu Long (Mekong) Delta. But the answer lay in the sprawling city under our feet – miles and miles of tunnels. In the gap between French occupation and the arrival of the Americans the tunnels fell largely into disrepair, but the area’s thick natural earth kept them intact and maintained by nature. In turn it became not just a place of hasty retreat or of refuge, but, in the words of one Vietnamese military historian, "an underground land of steel, home to the depth of hatred and the immutability of the people." It became the linked threat from the Viet Cong against Saigon that forced our unwitting leaders to select Cu Chi as the best site for a massive supply base – smack on top of the then 25-year old tunnel network. Even sporadic attacks on the new base, failed for months to indicate where the attackers were coming from – and, importantly, where they were retreating to. It was only when captives and defectors talked that it became slightly more clear. But still the entries, exits, and even the sheer scale of the tunnels weren’t even guessed at. Chemicals, smoke-outs, razing by fire, and bulldozing of whole areas, pinpointed only a few of the well-hidden tunnels and their entrances. The emergence of the Tunnel Rats, a detachment of southern Vietnamese working with Americans small enough to fit in the tunnels, could only guess at the sheer scale of Cu Chi. By the time war ended, little of the complex, and its infrastructure of schools, dormitories, hospitals, and miles of tunnels, had been uncovered. The wells that provided the vital drinking water are still active, producing clear and clean water to the three-tiered system of tunnels that sustained life.
Some routes linked to local rivers, including the Saigon River, their top soil firm enough to take construction and the movement of heavy machinery by American tanks, the middle tier from mortar attacks, and the lower, 8-10m down was impregnable. A series of hidden, and sometimes booby-trapped, doors connected the routes, down through a system of narrow, often unlit and poorly vented tunnels. But the Americans were never passive about the tunnels, despite being unaware of their sheer complexity. Large-scale raiding operations used tanks, artillery and air raids, water was pumped through known tunnels, and engineers laid toxic gas. But one American commander’s report at the time said: "It’s impossible to destroy the tunnels because they are too deep and extremely tortuous."
Anonymous....
israel is the canary in the coalmine.
what happens to them, happens to europe, then us.
they are also on the leading edge of effective tactics. so studying what they do and how they do it isn't a bad idea.
we could definitely uses some Israeli expertise on our southern border, for example.
studying the past to win in the future isn't all last century..it can be last week too.
maMy sons tell me I'm stuck in the last century. We recently spent A week out in the field, it rained for three days straight, and it took another day for things to dry out. My M1 Garand performed flawlessly. Even the AK's had some feed problems. What surprised me was how well the SKS's performed.
When I first became an Air Force cop, we still had the M-79, the 90mm recoilless rifle and the 81mm mortar in the inventory. And yeah, they do a fine job of blowing stuff up. Brings a smile to my face just thinking about it :-)
Time is not on Israel's side because to be eternally on the defensive is draining, and the enemy can further erode the defender's will while learning their weaknesses by constantly probing defenses and learning weaknesses. This is the same reason that fortresses and castles ultimately became obsolete, because it's easier and cheaper to conduct a siege than to defend against one.
Arabs and Persians are not stupid and have tenacity that a pitbull would admire, and they have far greater resources and time. Without divine intervention, Israel is screwed.
I think some of you may have missed some of the better instruction this provided. Look not so much at what it says about Israel or our relationship, but for a moment, imagine (as I suspect was Mike's intent) that Israel is the well funded federal government, and Hezbollah is a resistance movement opposing unconstitutional actions.
* combat reviews - obviously you need some experience to do this but the idea of constant self examination and improvement should be one we take to heart in many daily activities. Don't assume that what you know now will suffice later. Constantly strive to improve, weed out inefficiencies, impracticalities, etc.
* the use of concealment in hit and fade operations.
* what a bunker looks like in terms of concealed access, compliment and size
* the value of harassment tecniques
* the value of good intelligence
* the value of the ability to control access to an area for an extended period of time
Now - flip it around and realize that when and if we fight a war on home soil, depending on where the battles take place, the concepts cited above usually are playing for the home court advantage. From that, we can learn from this some follies to avoid when you are the aggressor.
* large visible units make easy targets
* the enemy knows the terrain better than you
* communication interdiction can not address only one means of signaling and be totally effective
* supply lines are not always readily identifiable
* your enemy could be right under your nose at the worst time
If you didn't watch all seven parts, I encourage you to do so. There is a wealth of detail to be analyzed and learned from in those short segments.
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