“Direct military operations” are precisely what the 4GW insurgent seeks to avoid. His target is the mind and the will of the political leadership of his enemy -- to be specific, the few inches between their ears which are filled with brains to be influenced or, if not, popped like a grape with an unanswerable rifle shot from distance as an example to the others.
Excerpted from the non-fiction introduction to Absolved: A
cautionary novel of the Three Percent and Fourth Generation Warfare by Mike Vanderboegh.
“Whenever the legislators endeavor to take away and
destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under
arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who
are thereupon absolved from any further
obedience and are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all
men, against force and violence.” ~ John Locke, 2nd Treatise on Government.
So reads the plaque on Phil Gordon's wall in his Sipsey Street home the moment before all
hell breaks loose. In 'Absolved', I try to explore the depths of Locke's belief
to discover where it might lead the United States in a civil war
set in the near future. . .
Another civil war in this
country is the last thing I want.
"The
Useful Dire Warning"
Darryl Bates: What started it?
Col. Andy Tanner: I don't know. Two toughest kids on the block, I guess.
Sooner or later, they're gonna fight.
Jed Eckert: That simple, is it?
Col. Andy Tanner: Or maybe somebody just forgot
what it was like. -- Red Dawn, 1984.
So why write about one? Perhaps, as David Brin, author of the magnificent book
The Postman (which bears no resemblance to the Costner cinematic flop), wrote
in a forward to a reprint of Pat Frank's classic Alas, Babylon:
Two books that emerged at roughly the same time as
Alas, Babylon were Eugene Burdick's Fail Safe and Peter George's Red Alert,
which later inspired Stanley Kubrick to make the magnificently humorous and
thoughtful Dr. Strangelove. As archetypes of the useful dire warning, each
dissected a specific possible failure mode, bringing it to the awareness of so
many that, ironically, their particular type of debacle became much less
likely. Indeed, the "self-preventing prophecy" may be the highest and
most useful species in all of the vast, imaginative genus of speculative
fiction. In much the same way that Orwell's 1984 girded millions against "Big
Brother," these tales may have helped to keep their own nightmares from
coming true. In other words, our most vivid nightmares may have been utterly
practical, helping to save our lives. -- David Brin, Forward to the First
Harper Perennial Modern Classics Edition of Pat Frank's 'Alas, Babylon', 2005, p. X.
One wonders what might have
happened prior to September 11, 2001 if someone in authority had taken Tom
Clancy’s “useful dire warnings” about a pilot deliberately flying a fuel-laden jet into the Capitol
building and killing the President and top leadership (Debt of Honor ,
1994; Executive Orders, 1996) about
enemies of this country crashing airliners into public buildings in Washington,
D.C. Clancy himself reacted to the
11 September 1001 attacks by Al Qaeda:
"Four planes? That many
people willing to die for the same cause at the same time? If any writer had
turned in a story like this, the publisher would have just handed it back and
said, 'No way. Not believable.' "
I can only hope that readers will take my own “useful dire warning”
more seriously. If one does ultimately break out, I will be as guilty of
fomenting it as Tom Clancy was guilty of 9/11 -- which is to say not at all. It is precisely what I am trying to avoid. . .
But the vignettes that will hopefully coalesce into a narrative that flows from
the terrible opening to a logical conclusion (and I hope a good read in
between) are also presented with such detail for a purpose. If this book is to
operate as a "useful dire warning," then both real sides in my
imaginary civil war must be able to recognize the real threat to avoid the
conflict.
You may ask, which sides and what kind of conflict?
On one side, just as in 1775, will be the Three Percent, on the other, Locke’s
“Arbitrary Power” -- and it will be a Fourth Generation War. All three
concepts require explanation.
The “Arbitrary Power”
"If
I could have gotten 51 votes in the Senate of the United States for an outright
ban (on so-called semi-automatic ‘assault rifles”), picking up every one of
them . . . Mr. and Mrs. America, turn 'em all in, I would have done it.” –
Senator Dianne Feinstein, CBS-TV's 60 Minutes, 5 February 1995.
When the Founders declared
independence, they prefaced that declaration with a detailed indictment of the
offenses of the King and his ministers. I
will not waste time or space here by comparing the present federal government’s
excesses of arbitrary power with those of King George III. Go and read the Declaration and you will
marvel at how today’s advocates of central power not only track quite closely
but make Lord North and Company look like kindergarten bullies in comparison.
The important thing to
understand about today’s arbitrary power is that it, like its predecessor, is a
corruption of – indeed, a subversion of – a constitution that should have
restrained it. It was the failure of the
English Constitution which led to our first Revolution. It will be the failure of our own Constitution
which will lead to our next civil war.
A key reason the revolution
succeeded was its strictly limited scope. The Founders sought only liberty, not
equality or fraternity. They aimed to make a political revolution, not a social
or an economic one. Their Lockean social-contract political philosophy taught
them that the preservation of individual liberty was the goal of politics. Its
basis was the surrender of a portion of man’s original, natural freedom to a
government that would protect the large remainder of it better than any
individual could do on his own — the freedom to make your own fate and think
your own thoughts without fear of bodily harm, unjust imprisonment, or robbery.
The Founders’ study of history taught them that the British constitution under
which they had lived — “originally and essentially free,” as Boston preacher Jonathan Mayhew described it
— was the ideal embodiment of such a contract. It was “the most perfect
combination of human powers in society,” John Adams wrote in 1766, “for the
preservation of liberty and the production of happiness”—until George III began
to violate it. So Americans didn’t take up arms to create a new world order
according to some abstract theory. They sought only to restore the political
liberty they had actually experienced for 150 years, and they constructed their
new government to preserve it. . .
So when, after 150 years of
letting Americans run their own affairs, the British government began to meddle
malignly with their liberty once 22-year-old George III became king in 1760,
following the death of his grandfather, George II, the colonists unsurprisingly
responded to the interference with outrage. After decreeing new colonial
customs duties and stricter enforcement in 1764, London imposed its first
direct levy on the colonies in 1765 in the Stamp Act, taxing every colonial
newspaper, journal, legal document, almanac, playing card, and other paper
product, in flagrant contravention of the “standing Maxim of English Liberty,”
as Livingston had quoted it more than a decade earlier, “ ‘that no Man shall be
taxed, but with his own Consent.’ ” As Washington wrote to a friend, “I think
the Parliament of Great Britain hath no more Right to put their hands into my
Pocket, without my consent, than I have to put my hands into your’s, for
money.” Property doesn’t belong to the government, and the social contract
gives government no right to tell you what to do with your own.
The American Revolution, then,
was doubly limited in its aims: limited to making only a political change without
altering social or economic arrangements, and determined to set strict limits
to its new government, fearful that any governmental power beyond the barest
minimum necessary to protect liberty too easily could become a threat to
liberty itself. . . – The Americanism of the American Revolution, Myron Magnet,
City Journal, Autumn 2012.
And, as we now know, the
Founders’ system of limited government has been crushed by a century of
encroaching Federal power.
"All laws which are
repugnant to the Constitution, are null and void." Chief Justice Marshall,
Marbury v. Madison
The advocates of the “arbitrary power,” of
course, say that they have the right to tell you what to do because they were
“democratically elected,” ignoring the fact that the Founders themselves feared
pure democracy as much or more as they feared any other kind of tyranny. Without the limits of a constitutional
republic, “democracy” is three wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for
dinner. The fact that the “arbitrarians”
win elections claiming “mandates” and have rigged the court systems to prevent
their diktats from being overturned means nothing to people who, like the
Founders, believe that their rights to liberty and property are God-given and
inalienable. The most uncompromising of
these are the Three Percent.
The
Three Percent – the so-called “bitter clingers.”
The Revolutionary War in the
southern states has received little attention in comparison to the detailed
study given the campaigns in the North. This is unfortunate since much decisive
action took place there, but perhaps the nature of the struggle accounts for
the historians’ neglect. The heroes of the southern fighting were not the
officers of the Continental army but rather the natural leaders of the people,
who had learned their skills in the continuing effort to seize the land of the
Indians.
By achieving better perspective of the past, something
may be accomplished in the present. For the hero of this book has fallen on
evil times. He is called various unflattering names today and is the butt of
comic-strip buffoonery and the ‘villain’ of serious novels. Because he remains
an individualist, he is a safe target.
There’s nothing new in this attitude, of course. In
the Revolutionary War period, he was sneered at by the rich merchants of the
lowlands, he was held in contempt by the Continental army’s high command, and
he was considered less than human by the British. Major Patrick Ferguson called
him a bandit, a barbarian, a mongrel. He had little respect for law and order.
He could be quite ruthless. He was also superstitious and at times naïve. Yet
Theodore Roosevelt could write of him:
‘The fathers followed Boone or fought at King’s
Mountain; the sons
marched south with Jackson
to overcome the Creeks; the grandsons
died at the Alamo.’
And, it should be added, the great-grandsons provided
Lee and Johnson with the best fighting infantry the world had yet seen. Poorly
clothed, half-starved, they responded magnificently to magnificent leadership
and almost won America’s
second civil war as their forefathers had won the first.
Moreover, in wars since, they have always been the
cutting edge. As F.N. Boney, the Georgia historian, puts it: ‘There
is no shortage of rednecks in the neat, quiet American military cemeteries
which now dot the globe. However rejected in normal times, the redneck has
always been welcomed when the nation went to war.’
Peace is the dream today, and the redneck shares that
dream. For him it was often a “rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight.” He never
started a war, but he was always ready when his home and personal liberty were
threatened. And because of the readiness to do his duty, this nation was
founded and kept alive….
Given proper leadership, the mountain man can still be
motivated. But in recent years such leadership has been largely lacking. The
potential remains untapped, but it is there. As my father used to say in Happy Valley--
you may turn the damper up, you may turn the damper down, but the smoke goes up
the chimney just the same.” -- Hank Messick, King’s Mountain,
1976.
History, for good or ill, is made by determined minorities. It is
estimated that during the American Revolution, the active forces in the field
against the King's tyranny never amounted to more than 3% of the colonists.
They were in turn actively supported by perhaps 10% of the population. Cheering
on these dedicated revolutionaries were perhaps another 20% who favored their
cause but did little or nothing to support it. Another one-third of the
population sided with the King (by the end of the war there were actually more
Americans fighting FOR the King than there were in the field against him) and
the final third took no side, blew with the wind and took what came.
The Three Percent still exists today, described by Barack Obama a few years ago
as “bitter clingers.” Put simply, these are firearm owners who will not
disarm, will not compromise and will no longer back up at the passage of the
next gun control act.
Today’s Three Percenters say quite explicitly that they will not obey any
further circumscription of their traditional liberties and will defend
themselves if attacked.
They intend, like John Locke and the Founders who studied him, to maintain
their God-given natural rights to liberty and property, and that means
most especially the right to keep and bear arms. Thus, they are committed to
the restoration of the Founders' Republic, and are willing to fight, die and,
if forced by any would-be oppressor, to kill in the defense of themselves and
the Constitution that they all took an oath to uphold against enemies foreign
and domestic.
It is the sons of Three
Percenters who make up the bulk of the tip-of-the-spear units in today’s
military simply because they were raised by families to whom service to the
Republic is as automatic as breathing.
Socio-economically, today’s Three Percenters are not exclusively the
descendants of the Scotch-Irish that Hank Messick describes above, but they are
surely represented heavily. So, too, are
descendants of the Texans, of whom S.C. Gwynne wrote in Empire of the Summer
Moon:
The (vanguard of the) westward
push of the Americans. . was not federal troops and federal forts but simple
farmers imbued with a fierce Calvinist work ethic, steely optimism, and a cold
eyed aggressiveness that made them refuse to yield even in the face of extreme
danger. They were said to fear God so
much that there was no fear left over for anyone or anything else . . .
–Page 20.
When the Texans discovered the
tactical utility of the Colt’s revolver gave them parity with the fearsome
Comanche lance on horseback, it spelled the end of that tribe’s ceturies long
dominance of the plains.
(T)he game had changed
completely. The Texans were not the
Spanish or the Mexicans. They were
tougher, meaner, almost impossible to discourage, willing to take absurd risks
to secure themselves a plot of dirt, and tempermentally well-suited to the
remorseless destruction of native tribes.
They did not rely on a cumbersome, heavily-mounted, overly
bureaucratized, state-sponsored soldiery; they tended to handle things
themselves, with volunteers who not only were not scared of Indians but
actually LIKED hunting them down. – Page 82.
Texans certainly ranked among
the Three Percenters of their day.
Three Percenters today do not claim that they represent 3% of the American
people, although they might. That theory has not yet been tested. They DO claim
that they represent at least 3% of American gun owners, which is still a
healthy number somewhere in the neighborhood of 3 million people. Remember,
history, for good or ill, is made by determined minorities. They are one
such minority. So too are the current domestic enemies of the Founders'
Republic who seek to disarm them. What remains, then, is the test of will
and skill to determine who shall shape the future of our nation.
That test of will and skill will be fought by warfare in the Fourth Generation.
"Cherish your enemies - they teach you the best lessons" -- Ho
Chi Minh.
Fourth Generation Warfare
For those unfamiliar with the term, here's one succinct definition from the
best single book on the subject:
(Fourth Generation Warfare) uses all available
networks -- political, economic, social, and military -- to convince the enemy's
political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or
too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency.
Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when
properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes
use of society's networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations,
it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead,
via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to
destroy the enemy's political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy
-- measured in decades rather than months or years. . . Strategically, 4GW
attempts to directly change the minds of enemy policy makers. This change
is not to be achieved through the traditional method of superiority on the
battlefield. The first- through third-generation of destroying the
enemy’s armed forces and his capacity to regenerate them is not how 4GW enemies
will attack . . . Both the epic, decisive Napoleonic battle and the
wide-ranging, high-speed maneuver campaign is irrelevant to them. Their
victories are accomplished through the superior use of all available networks
to directly defeat the will of the enemy leadership, to convince them their war
aims are either unachievable or too costly. These networks will be
employed to carry specific messages to our policy makers and to those who can
influence the policy makers. -- COL
Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, The Sling and the Stone, p. 208
And what were the previous three generations? William S. Lind offers this
in his essay, the Four Generations of Modern Warfare at the Lew Rockwell blog:
The First Generation of modern war began with the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the
Thirty Years War. It also marked the state's assumption of a monopoly on war;
thereafter, war became something waged by states, for raison d'etat, with state
armies and navies doing the fighting. The First Generation ran from 1648 to
about the time of the American Civil War, and it was characterized, on the
whole, by a battlefield of order. The battlefield of order created a military
culture of order, which endures to this day.
And there's the rub. For around the middle of the 19th century, the
battlefield of order began to break down. Ever since, state militaries have had
to grapple with a growing contradiction between their internal culture of order
and the external reality of an increasingly disordered battlefield.
The Second and Third Generations represent two different approaches to
that problem. Second Generation war was developed by the French Army during and
after World War I, and is best summed up with the French saying, "The
artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Also known as
firepower/attrition warfare, Second Generation war maintained the First
Generation culture of order. Decision-making was centralized and hierarchical;
orders were detailed and controlling, to permit synchronization of all arms;
time was not particularly important; and success was measured by comparative
body counts. Second Generation armed forces focus inward on methods, processes
and procedures, prize obedience over initiative (initiative and synchronization
are not compatible) and depend on imposed discipline. The American Army and Marine
Corps learned Second Generation war from the French during the First World War
and still practice it today, with exceptions based on individual commanders.
Third Generation war, also known as maneuver warfare, was developed by
the German Army in World War I; by 1918, Blitzkrieg was conceptually complete,
lacking only the tanks necessary for operational mobility. The Prussian/German
roots of Third Generation war go back earlier, to the Scharnhorst reforms that
followed Prussia's
defeat by Napoleon. One of those reforms changed what was required of a
Prussian officer; instead of being responsible for obeying orders, he became
responsible for getting the result the situation required regardless of orders
(in 19th century war games, it was common for junior Prussian officers to be
given problems that could only be solved by disobeying orders). This in turn
created a military culture that was focused outward, on the enemy, the
situation and the result the situation demanded instead of inward on rules,
orders and processes. In effect, Prussia had broken with the First
Generation culture of order.
The new Third Generation tactics developed by the Germans in World War I
were the first non-linear tactics. On the defense, the objective became sucking
the enemy in, then cutting him off, rather than holding a line. On the
offensive, the attack flowed like water through the enemy's defenses, always
seeking the weakest point to penetrate, then rolling him up from his own rear
forward. Operationally as well as tactically the goal was usually encirclement.
Speed replaced firepower as the most important tool, and dislocation, mental as
well as physical, was more important than attrition. Culturally, not only was
the German Army outward-focused, it prized initiative over obedience and it
depended on self-discipline rather than imposed discipline.
Much of the American military reform movement of the 1970s, 80s and early
90s was an attempt to move the American armed forces from the Second to the
Third Generation. While the Marine Corps formally adopted maneuver warfare as
doctrine in the 1990s, most of what the Marine Corps does remains Second
Generation. The other American services remain almost wholly Second Generation,
to the frustration of many junior officers.
Fourth Generation war is the greatest change since the Peace of Westphalia, because it marks the end of the state's
monopoly on war. Once again, as before 1648, many different entities, not
states, are fighting war. They use many different means, including
"terrorism" and immigration, not just formal armies. Differences
between cultures, not just states, become paramount, and other cultures will
not fight the way we fight. All over the world, state militaries are fighting
non-state opponents, and almost always, the state is losing. State militaries
were designed to fight other state militaries like themselves, and against
non-state enemies most of their equipment, tactics and training are useless or
counterproductive.
Daniel Morgan
“Sure won’t his Majesty’s Government train
them for me?”
Of course there have been Fourth Generation insurgencies for thousands of
years, as well as the use of 4GW tactics and strategies by state militaries
against other state militaries.
(See Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.) The
American Revolution began as an insurgency of largely non-state actors and used
militia guerrilla tactics throughout the war even after the development of the
Continental Line.
(See Paul Revere’s Ride and Washington’s Crossing by
David Hackett Fischer.)
The most remarkable and effective field commander of the Revolutionary forces
was Daniel Morgan, whose ability to integrate militia and regulars at the
battle of Cowpens set up Cornwallis’ ultimate defeat at Yorktown.
(See A Devil of a Whipping by Lawrence F. Babits, also Daniel Morgan:
Revolutionary Rifleman by Don Higginbotham.)
A veteran of the French and Indian War, Morgan commanded one of Virginia’s two rifle
companies sent to support the Siege of Boston in late June 1775. Morgan
had served as an officer in the Virginia Colonial Militia since the French and
Indian War. He recruited 96 men in 10 days and assembled them at Winchester on 14 July. He
then marched them 600 miles to Boston
in only 21 days, arriving on Aug. 6, 1775. Known as Morgan’s Riflemen,
they soon discouraged British raids out of Boston with the accuracy of their long-range
fire, something the British could not match. He also initiated tactics
which first targeted the British formation’s Indian guides, then their
officers, then their NCOs. The British found this to be “barbaric.”
Morgan was an impressive field commander, big in size yet poorly educated, he
enjoyed drinking and gambling but the troops never forgot who was in
command. Morgan had served as a civilian teamster during the French and
Indian War. After returning from the advance on Fort Duquesne
by General Braddock's command, he was punished with 499 lashes (a usually fatal
sentence) for punching his superior officer. Morgan, not surprisingly, hated
the British army. He later served as a rifleman in the Provincial forces
assigned to protect the western border settlements from French-backed Indian
raids, and in 1774 he served in Dunmore's War, taking part in raids on Shawnee villages in the
Ohio Country.
During the Saratoga campaign, Morgan’s riflemen
played a key role at the preliminary battles of Freeman’s Farm and later at Bemis Heights,
where at his order the British General Fraser was mortally wounded at his order
by rifleman Tim Murphy. This was the single most important rifle shot of
the war, since the loss of Fraser caused the British attack to collapse and the
subsequent surrender of the entire British force persuaded the French to
enter the war.
After Cowpens, Morgan went home on sick leave, but he had certainly paid the
British back for those 499 lashes. There were many Revolutionary officers
and men who had acquired their military experience in the French and
Indian War. And like Morgan, many of them had also acquired an acute
understanding of what the British army could and could not do in the terrain of
North America.
This formation of young soldiers in the crucible of war is a constant found
throughout history. The primary lessons were moral ones, not
military. And morale is critical in 4GW.
As Hammes describes in the beginning of The Sling and the Stone:
From 1987 to 1990, I got a small taste of the
practical aspects of insurgency. I spent those years training insurgents in
various locations of the world. This was the tail end of the Cold War and the United States
still had vested interests in the outcome of a number of insurgencies. The most
intriguing part of the tour was the opportunity to talk to these men. I was
particularly impressed with two aspects of the men I met. First was their utter
determination to continue the struggle despite the odds. They were not deterred
by fear of death. In each case, they were engaged in a struggle with a
government force that possessed many times their military power. In each case,
they knew the odds and were not deterred. They believed in their cause and were
sure that belief was powerful enough to defeat the government. The idea they
fought for was central to their resistance. In fact, they were counting on
political power generated by that idea to neutralize the overwhelming military
power of the government. As I worked with these men, I realized this fact
should be obvious to Americans. An idea kept our American revolution alive
during seven long years of war. (Emphasis supplied, MBV. It should also be
noted that for most of the key leaders of our Revolution, the struggle began a
decade earlier with the Stamp Act crisis.)
The second outstanding trait was the remarkable ingenuity they displayed
for overcoming problems. Whether the problems were tactical, logistical,
doctrinal, or political, they often attacked them from a direction that simply
would not occur to a Western-trained soldier. I found insurgents are not
impressed with conventional power. They respect it but seek ways around it --
and have consistently succeeded in finding those ways. They often used tactics
and techniques that were outside the training and experience of the government
forces. Despite years of war, they consistently surprised government forces
with their ingenuity and determination. Insurgents are living proof of why man
is at the top of the food chain. We are the most creative, treacherous, loyal,
aggressive, and determined life form to yet evolve. Any nation that assumes it
is inherently superior to another is setting itself up for disaster.
I would add to that last sentence that the same goes for political elites, only
more so. This is perfectly understood by 4GW fighters.
Michael Collins, perhaps the 20th Century’s most accomplished virtuoso in 4GW,
fought in the disastrous 1916 Easter Rising, and afterward was being paraded
with other prisoners through the streets of Dublin on their way to prison.
Michael Collins
As the column passed the ruins of Liberty Hall, a young woman caught up with
her cousin (Collins) and called out to him. “What will you do now?”
“Do?” asked Collins, “Do? Sure I’ll get ready for the next round of
course. I’ve got some of the names taken down already . . . The best of
men.” His cousin was flabbergasted. “But …. What? . . . How are you
going to train them?” she called out. Collins replied, “Sure won’t His
Majesty’s Government train them for me?”
(See Michael Collins by Tim Pat
Coogan. Also, Collins’ best field commander in West Cork, Tom Barry, was
a British Army veteran of the Iraq
theatre during World War One. See Barry’s Guerilla Days in Ireland.)
This is something that the governments who seek to fight 4GW don’t
understand. The 4GW warrior thinks in terms of decades, not months or
years. He or she will fight until victory or death. The long wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan,
then, can also be seen as universities for American armed citizens in 4GW
tactics and techniques.
So, who invented 4th Generation Warfare?
Says Hammes in The Sling and the Stone:
This new form of war did not arrive on the scene as a
fully developed instrument but has evolved over decades and continues to evolve
at widely scattered locations. We are not in the middle of a revolution
in military affairs but rather an evolution.
Different authors assign different origins to 4GW. Hammes traces it to
Mao Tse-Tung, yet we know that much of Mao’s theory was based upon the ancient
Sun Tsu. Hammes then discusses the “Vietnamese modification” and the
“Sandanista refinement.” In each of the latter cases the insurgents were
fighting for control of the mindset of the United States Congress through
popular opinion within our country. But of course this is precisely how the
Founders of our own country defeated the British -- the defeat at Yorktown
caused Lord North’s government to collapse and the new government that replaced
it came in with a promise to end the North American war, which it promptly did.
(For more on the Vietnamese example, see Street Without Joy by Bernard B. Fall,
who suggests that the principal theorist of 4GW on the communist side was
neither Ho Chi Minh nor Vo Nguyen Giap but Truong-Chinh.)
The American example also inspired Michael Collins, who added his own
improvisation which proved decisive:
Collins evolved a new concept of guerrilla warfare
that in time would be copied by guerrilla leaders all over the globe from Mao
to Shamir. The Collins philosophy was based not on the capture of enemy
bricks and mortar, but of its information. Traditionally Dublin Castle,
the seat of British administration in Ireland, had used a network of
spies and informers to infiltrate and then snuff out movements directed at
securing Irish independence. Collins perfected a system of spying on the
spies. Every important branch of the Castle system, whether it was
banking, policing, the railways, shipping, the postal service -- whatever --
was infiltrated by his agents. These were not highly trained, CIA-style
operatives, but ordinary men and women, little people whom nobody had ever
taken notice of before. Collins gave them a belief in themselves, a
courage they did not know they possessed, and they in return gave him a
complete picture of how their masters operated. . . For the first time in their
history the Irish had a team of assassins trained to eliminate informers. . .
Held back from making a full-scale use of their Army by the force of
world opinion -- largely Irish-American opinion -- the British tried to fight a
“police war’ carried on by hastily-formed forces of ex-servicemen and officers
troubled by little discipline and less conscience. The Black and Tans and
the Auxiliaries wrote new chapters of horror in the bloodstained story of the
Anglo-Irish relationship. Reprisals for the activities Collins and his
colleagues included the burning of homes and creameries, random murder and the
widespread use of torture . . .
In addition to his campaign of warfare, he ran a national loan, which was
banned by the British so that either its advertisement or sale became
illegal. Yet the loan was fully subscribed, and every subscriber got a
receipt.
(Again, see Michael Collins by Tim Pat Coogan, as well as G2 In Defence
of Ireland: Irish Military Intelligence 1918-1945 by Maurice Walsh.)
As brilliant as he was, Collins would later claim that he drew much of his own
inspiration from the lessons learned by the Boer commando Christiaan Rudolph de
Wet.
British General Rupert Smith, in his very useful book The Utility of Force,
passes over the American Revolution with a few words and then identifies the
“war amongst the people” (his term for 4GW) as being invented by the Spanish
and Portuguese guerrillas in their “little war” against Napoleon’s forces.
It is safe to say that 4GW has been evolving over at least the past couple of
centuries, not the decades Hammes suggests, and certainly in terms of timeline,
the American revolutionaries of 1775 can lay as good a claim as any to being
its inventors. This is an opinion that the current American Three Percent
have no problem adopting.
However, a 4GW civil war waged
by men and women who are loyal to the Founders’ concepts would not fight an unrestrained
Al Qaeda campaign but one specifically targeted to spare civilians and to
target the war decision makers. The next
American civil war will either successfully break new ground in 4GW tactics and
techniques or it will descend into a welter of blood and massacre. Governments have a tendency to do that when
they’re losing. The 4GW warriors who
claim to represent the Founders’ Republic will have to require of themselves far more
discipline and intelligence -- no Fort Sumters and no Oklahoma City bombings.
The Utility of Force by a Regime to Impose
its Will, or Lack Thereof.
War amongst the people is both a graphic description
of modern warlike situations, and also a conceptual framework: it reflects the
hard fact that there is no secluded battlefield upon which armies engage, nor
are there necessarily armies, definitely not on all sides. To be clear:
this is not asymmetric warfare, a phrase I dislike invented to explain a
situation in which conventional states were threatened by unconventional powers
but in which conventional military power in some formulation would be capable
of both deterring the threat and responding to it. War amongst the people
is different: it is the reality in which the people in the streets and houses
and fields -- all the people, anywhere -- are the battlefield. Military
engagements can take place anywhere : in the presence of civilians, against
civilians, in defense of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives
to be won, as much as an opposing force. . . Labeling wars as asymmetric is to
me something of a euphemism to avoid acknowledging that my opponent is not
playing to my strengths and I am not winning. -- General Rupert Smith,
The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, pp. 5-6
The advocates of the disarmament of the American populace such as the
aforementioned CSGV always begin by saying that no group of citizenry can
oppose the might of the federal government because of the vast array of
weaponry including aircraft, artillery and even nuclear weapons that the
federals could bring to bear if they are opposed trumps any number of armed
“insurrectionists” with rifles. This ludicrous argument is not only
contradicted by many examples throughout history but begs the moral question of
resistance to a predatory government itself. If a government is so
depraved as to use nuclear weapons against its own people on its own soil, it
will not long survive the condemnation of even the people who otherwise support
it. The same goes for artillery and air strikes, even so called
“surgical, decapitation operations.” (More about that in a minute.)
Such weapons are, in 4GW, merely expensive but useless, appendages, especially
in an uncontrolled media environment.
The fact that CSGV and its collectivist familiars even suggest the nuclear
boogeyman as a real threat by the federal government merely marks them as moral
pariahs -- inciters of holocaust -- and tells you everything you need to know
about such people. THEY are apparently the ones who are willing to see
millions of their own citizens dead in pursuit of gun control and a government
monopoly on violence. They are bloodthirsty people indeed.
The utility -- practical or moral -- of using even precision-guided munitions
from artillery or aircraft in a civil war upon your own people, in your own
territory and athwart your own logistics tail is also militarily problematic,
especially in a media environment that includes the Internet, even more
especially in a country such as the U.S. which depends upon it for so much of
its own economic activity that it cannot be totally shut down.
First, such strikes are not entirely “precision-guided” as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to “collateral
damage” (a sanitary military euphemism for dead civilians) and moral
discredit. Remember such a civil war would be “amongst the people” in
General Smith’s term and for their loyalty. Thus any smart 4GW operator
is going to eliminate the possibility of his side creating “collateral
damage.” Notice I said “eliminate the possibility.” Only a fool or
a government agent would try to advance his or her cause by committing an Oklahoma City bombing
with a day-care full of innocent kids in it. Remember, too, that 4GW
warfare is designed to change the minds of the war making elite in their
opponent’s capitol. OKC bombings merely strengthen their hand, not
discredit it. (Recall that after he was re-elected in 1996, Bill Clinton
told reporters on Air Force One while traveling back to DC from Arkansas that
“Oklahoma City broke the spell.”)
Indeed, if you are looking for a weapon that is in fact “precision-guided” you
need look no further than a bolt-action rifle aimed at an identified target and
wielded by someone who knows what to do with it. This, in fact, defines
the Three Percenters, who, being limited to rifles, know them very well and
compete with each other to win competition matches somewhere in this country
every weekend. Can this be why Senator Dianne Feinstein -- a long-time
advocate of “turn ‘em in, Mr. and Mrs. America” -- is so obsessed with
“sniper” rifles that can “puncture a limousine” or “take down an
aircraft”? (See “A Short History of Long Range Shooting in the United States”
by Hap Rocketto in The Rifleman’s Journal, September 2009.)
Second, such bad publicity might be endured if the civil war was quickly put to
an end by such tactics, but in 4GW this is not only uncertain, it is fantasy.
The final critical characteristic of 4GW is that its
timelines, organizations, and objectives are different from those of earlier
generations. Of particular importance is understanding that the timelines
are much longer. . .
The United States
wants to fight short, well-defined wars. We went into Vietnam, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq
convinced we could “clean it up” quickly. In each conflict, our leaders
told the people we would be out in a year or so. . . For the United States,
a long war is five years . . .
Unfortunately, 4GW wars are long. The Chinese Communists fought for
twenty-eight years (1921-1949). The Vietnamese Communists fought for
thirty years (1945-1975). The Sandinistas
fought for eighteen years (1961-1979). The Palestinians have been
resisting Israeli occupation for twenty-nine years so far (1975-2004).
The Chechens have been fighting for more than ten years -- this time.
Al-Qaeda has been fighting for their vision of the world for twenty years,
since the founding of MAK in 1984. Numerous other insurgencies have
lasted decades. Accordingly, when getting involved in a 4GW fight, we
should be planning for a decades-long commitment. From an American point
of view, this may well be the single most important characteristic of
4GW.
Next, we need to understand that 4GW organizations are different.
Since Mao, 4GW organizations have focused on the movement’s long-term political
viability rather than its short-term tactical effectiveness. They do see
themselves as military organizations but as webs that generate the political
power central to 4GW. Thus, these organizations are unified by
ideas. The leadership and the organizations are networked to provide for
survivability and continuity when attacked. And the leadership recognizes
that their most important function is to sustain the idea and the organizations
-- not simply to win on the battlefield. -- COL Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, The Sling and
the Stone, p. 221-2.
Much is made in Third-Generation Warfare of “getting inside the enemy’s OODA
Loop” (for observe, orient, decide, and act) in order to disrupt their
operations. Hammes points out that 4GW warriors don’t even
try.
Finally, because of the long timelines, even the
objectives are different. Fourth-generation-warfare opponents do not seek
to service more targets faster to disrupt an enemy’s OODA loop. They do
not seek to destroy an opponent’s industrial base using the U.S. Air Force’s concept of
targeting key segments of an opponent’s society. Nor do they seek to
dislocate the enemy’s armed forces so that their decision cycle fails and the
enemy collapses. In fact, it is essential to 4GW strategists that the
opponent complete his strategic OODA loop -- with the resulting decision that
the war is too costly to continue. -- Hammes, Ibid.
For the government monopoly of force advocates of CSGV, I would like to point
out that it is impossible to nuke an idea to extinction, especially on your own
soil.
Hammes concludes the chapter:
Fourth-generation-warfare opponents focus on the
political aspects of the conflict. Because the ultimate objective is
changing minds of of the enemy’s political leadership, the intermediate objectives
are all milestones in shifting the opinion of the various target audience
audiences. They know that time is on their side, Westerners in
general, and Americans in particular, are not known for their patience.
We are not a people who think in terms of struggles lasting decades.
Fourth-generation-warfare enemies will not seek immediate objectives but a long term shift in the political will of their
enemies. They will accept numerous tactical and operational setbacks in
pursuit of the goal.
Colonel Harry Summers noted in his book On Strategy: A Critical Analysis
of the Vietnam War that after the war he told a North Vietnamese colonel that
the United States
had never been beaten on the battlefield. The North Vietnamese replied,
“That is true. It is also irrelevant.” It is essential to
understand that 4GW opponents do not focus on swift battlefield
victories. They focus on long term strategic approach. They focus
on winning wars, not battles. -- Hammes, Ibid.
In an American civil war between an ideas-based Three Percent and a
disarmament-bent federal government, who then would lose interest first?
You cannot destroy an idea, not even an obviously bad and evil one -- witness
collectivism in all its forms. And Hammes further points out “At the operational
level, all an opponent has to move is ideas. (Emphasis supplied,
MBV.) He can do so through a wide variety of methods, from email to snail
mail to personal courier to messages embedded in classified
advertisements. He will try to submerge his communications in the noise
of the everyday activity that is an essential part of modern society. It
will be extraordinarily difficult to detect the operational level activities of
a 4GW opponent.” (Page 218.)
Yes, it will. Especially in a civil war set in your own highly-developed
country.
Potential 4GW Civil War Targeting: The
Federal Government’s and the Three Percent’s
Military Target (ordnance)
Any industrial plant, city, or other object, or any person, group of
persons, or force marked as a target for destruction, damage, injury, or
capture because of its direct or indirect use in the conduct or support of an
enemy's military endeavor.
In restricted usage, a military person, force, installation, or area
marked as a target because of its use, or potential use, in direct military
operations.
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific & Technical Terms, 6E, Copyright
© 2003
This definition is made obsolete by 4GW because “direct military operations”
are precisely what the 4GW insurgent seeks to avoid. His target is the
mind and the will of the political leadership of his enemy -- to be specific, the few inches between their ears which are filled with brains to be influenced or, if not, popped like a grape with an unanswerable rifle shot from distance as an example to the others.
Let us make an example of the difference by briefly war-gaming the American
Revolution using present-day 4GW tactics.
David Bushnell's Turtle
Early in the war, the following incidents occur:
Benjamin Franklin arranges a coordinated attack by David Bushnell in his
submersible and John Paul Jones in the Ranger on English commercial
shipping in the Thames estuary -- right at the King‘s doorstep in full view of
horrified Englishmen who never thought the war would come there. Bushnell
has greater success against the commercial shipping because their wooden hulls
are not copper-sheathed as are British military hulls. This “infernal
device” which strikes without warning or even apparent effective countermeasure
frightens British shippers. Bushnell, John Paul Jones and his surviving
crew are taken prisoner, but the very destructive raid, which also sets a large
portion of the London docks ablaze, is just as stunning, if not more so, than
the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in 1942.
The Ranger
Meanwhile, Franklin dispatches a trio of
riflemen by way of a neutral port into London.
One fine day, when Lord North emerges from his country estate, he is killed by
an aimed shot from 300 yards away. His wife, standing next to him, is
unharmed.
(NOTE: Lord North is targeted, but not the King. Under 4GW
rules the King would be sacrosanct, just as an American President in the 21st
Century would be. Anyone around them, however, would be fair 4GW targets
if involved in the decisions or operations which oppress their own
people. Remember, the point of 4GW is to destroy the will of the enemy
elite to proceed with the war, not give them motivation to win, or provide them
a propaganda coup to use with the people.) After North is replaced, the
replacement King‘s minister is shot as well in identical circumstances.
Simultaneously, Franklin activates a third group
already living quietly in England
to attack by arson the buildings of the British East India Company, Lloyds of
London and the Company of the Bank of England. They do this at night so
there are no civilian casualties, although several adjoining structures are
inevitably destroyed as well.
The attacks by John Paul Jones & Bushnell are (barely) within the rules of
war and Franklin
takes credit for them. The others are plausibly deniable. British
merchants and politicians get the point, however. This war against the
American revolutionaries is going to cost them far more than they ever
dreamed. How long would they have supported the King’s North American
obsession when they were cumulatively losing hundreds of thousands of English
pounds daily?
In addition, any federal government of the United States which wishes to make
war on its own people must overcome a few statistics unrelated to the Three
Percent or 4GW. The United
States is made up of 3.79 MILLION square
miles with somewhere around 315 million people living there. This makes
it the third largest nation in the world by both land area and
population. There are, not unimportantly, something on the order of 100
million firearm owners scattered across our vast country and about 200 to 300
million firearms.
By comparison, Iraq is only
168,754 square miles in area (about the size of the state of California) with only 31 million in
population. Afghanistan
is a bit bigger with 250,000 square miles in area and a population also of
around 30 million. What kind of bloody-minded fool would deliberately
ignite an insurgency in a country -- especially his own -- 9 times larger than
both of those combined and containing 5 times the population, many of them
armed and skilled at the use of those arms?
“Decapitation”
“Don't you ever stand for that sort of thing. Someone ever tries to kill
you, you try to kill 'em right back. -- Captain Malcolm Reynolds, Firefly,
2002.
After more than a decade in Afghanistan
and Iraq,
the American policy elite believes it has a pretty good bead on
counterinsurgency in 4th Generation Warfare which rests principally on one
tactic: decapitation.
Leadership decapitation is a high-profile tactic that
involves the capture or killing of top insurgent leaders. It is frequently used
against guerrilla insurgencies: in the past two centuries, top insurgent
leaders have been killed or captured in just under 50 percent of
counterinsurgency campaigns. Yet we know little about the nature of the
relationship between leadership decapitation and counterinsurgency
effectiveness. Is capturing or killing insurgencies’ leader(s) an effective
tactic? Or is it counterproductive, radicalizing insurgent movements,
strengthening their resolve, and making them more difficult to defeat? Or does
it have no effect at all? The general consensus is that leadership
decapitation of guerrilla groups is ineffective. These conclusions should
give scholars pause: they are based on unsystematic research designs, minimal
empirical data, and incomparable units--usually terrorist organizations or
foreign leaders. Patrick Johnston, “The Effectiveness of Leadership
Decapitation in Counterinsurgency”
Johnston himself believes decapitation is effective and though he criticizes
the critics of decapitation, his work shows an almost entire ignorance of 4GW
which presumably decapitation is supposed to defeat. How does a drone
strike, for example, kill an idea? A broader consideration with a little
history is found at Michael Zenko’s Politics, Power, and Preventative action
blog at the Council on Foreign Relations:
The United
States did not always carry out targeted
killings (or assassinations) of perceived national security threats. To the
contrary, the norm against targeted killings outside of battlefield settings
was established by President Gerald Ford in 1976, when he issued Executive
Order 11905: “No employee of the United States Government shall
engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.” Until the late
1990s, U.S.
targeted killings were officially proscribed and rarely seriously considered or
authorized by senior officials.
When President Ronald Reagan was asked about the failed assassination
attempt of Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah in Beirut in March 1985, for instance, he
replied: “Never would I sign anything that would authorize an assassination. I
never have, and I never will, and I didn’t.” Actually, Reagan signed a
directive on November 13, 1984, that was interpreted as “truly a ‘license to
kill’ provision.” Sixteen years later, U.S.
ambassador to Israel Martin
Indyk stated: “The United
States government is very clearly on the
record as against targeted assassinations. They are extrajudicial killings, and
we do not support that.” However, after the U.S.
embassy bombings in Africa in August 1998,
President Clinton issued three top-secret Memoranda of Understanding
authorizing the CIA to kill Osama bin Laden and several key lieutenants—if they
resisted capture.
Despite these exceptions, U.S.
targeted killings were extremely rare. Since 9/11, however, targeted killings
in nonbattlefield settings steadily grew under President George W. Bush—roughly
50 between November 2002 and the end of his second term—and exploded under
President Barack Obama—almost 350 and counting.
As some operations are covert—when the lead executive authority is the
CIA—while others are obliquely acknowledged with few specifics—when it is the
Department of Defense—there are ethical, moral, and legal questions that have
gone unaddressed, due partly to lack of public debate and congressional
hearings. Just as there remains intense disagreement among former officials
about whether enhanced interrogation techniques (i.e., torture) against
suspected terrorists “worked” to produce useful and/or actionable intelligence,
it is difficult to know whether U.S. targeted killings are a successful and
sustainable means of achieving U.S. short- or long-term strategic objectives.
Zenko’s column consulted several experts, including Johnston. Among them, Daniel
Byman, a professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and
the research director of the Saban Center at Brookings, the author of A High
Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism, wrote:
Targeted killings work—just not in all places and at
all times. They can steadily attrite a terrorist group’s leadership and, over
time, leaving it with fewer impressive leaders and fewer skilled personnel.
Their biggest impact, however, is often in what the terrorist organization does
not do. Leaders must spend their time hiding and changing locations in order to
survive. They must curtail phone communications and avoid interacting with
large groups of followers, all of which make them far less able to guide the
organization, inspire followers, and enforce their will. Leaders often
instigate witch-hunts in order to go after supposed traitors who provided the
lethal intelligence, further reducing the group’s effectiveness.
Targeted killings, however, are a tactic, not a strategy. The inevitable
civilian deaths that occur can at times, but do not always, create significant
numbers of additional enemies as well as carrying a moral burden. And
politically it is tempting to ignore the broader dimensions of counterterrorism
and counterinsurgency as long as bad guys are dying on a regular basis. These
faults and limits, while serious, should not lead to the rejection of targeted
killings but rather a recognition of its costs and why alone they will not
suffice.
Again, this shows an imperfect understanding, even by Al Qaeda and the Taliban,
of 4GW. 4GW does not require organizations to be successful, merely the
transmission of ideas to independent actors of like beliefs who organize
locally and attack locally, even if the targets are of national or even
international, significance.
Sarah Holewinski, executive director of Center for Civilians in Conflict, a
human rights advocate and critic of U.S. drone policy, comes closest to
understanding the limited use of decapitation in a 4GW world.
They may kill some of the people they’re intended to
kill some of the time. But as a stand-in for long-term counterterrorism policy,
covert drone strikes in particular may be doing more harm than good to national
security. They’re supposed to rid the United States of enemies without
the cost of troop lives or the muck of a traditional invasion.
But on the other side of the balance sheet, drone strikes are creating
anger—not only among locals in Pakistan and Yemen, but among people elsewhere
who want an excuse to hate America. Even for America’s
fans, strikes call into question U.S. commitment to responsible use
of force, thanks to the information vacuum around who can be targeted, why,
under what legal framework, and how CIA and Special Forces protocols protect
civilians.
A fight worth fighting comes with sacrifice. Drones have relieved much of
the sacrifice born by the soldier but not the civilian, who lives in constant
fear of sudden death. Regardless of civilian casualties, which are highly
disputed, the psychological trauma, displacement, and suspicion among neighbors
of colluding with one side or the other has turned communities into war zones,
even with no visible boots on the ground. No wonder ordinary people are
chanting “Death to America”
after strikes.
There are no numbers on how many formerly agnostic civilians are now
skeptical about U.S.
power nor how many terrorists may arise as a result of the current drone
policy. That X factor is reason enough to pause before claiming a
counterterrorism panacea.
The American people are largely supportive of decapitation as applied in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but what happens when
the targets are in Marion, Ohio
or Salt Lake City, Utah? What happens when the killings of
their friends and neighbors go on and on because the federal government can
think of no better way to compel obedience to unjust, unconstitutional diktats
contrary to the Founders’ Republic?
Back on 17 September 2009, in a column on my blog Sipsey Street Irregulars, I
noted Patrick Johnston’s embrace of decapitation strategies -- “Dark Thoughts
-- Misadventure, Spasm & Decapitation. How I spent Constitution Day” -- and
commented on how, hypothetically, that might play out.
The thing is, once started, the regime will find it
almost impossible to stop on any terms besides their own unconditional
surrender as they would be fighting an enraged but dispersed network
insurgency. It is likely that after a few weeks of such blood-letting, the
administration will be unable to find anybody left alive with sufficient
influence among the insurgents with whom they can negotiate an end to the
horror. The fact of the matter is that they would have done their best to kill
the folks they would need to stop what they started.
And they will want to stop it, oh, yes, out of concern for their own
miserable hides if nothing else.
For they will have provoked a conflict that will not be directed at the
war-fighters, the grunts, even those in the outnumbered federal police, but
rather at the war-makers, i.e. themselves.
In this they have only Bill Clinton to blame. When the Philanderer in
Chief, frustrated with Serbian intransigence in 1999, changed the rules of
engagement to include the political leadership, news media and the intellectual
underpinning of his enemy's war effort, he accidentally filed suit under the
Law of Unintended Consequences. The Serbians knuckled under, yes. But the rest
of the world took note, including (the Three Percent). I assure you, the appeal
to the higher court of history in that case has yet to be decided.
Decapitation, I have tried to explain to people, works both ways in 4GW.
I continued:
Johnston is as wrong as he can be when comparing past
history to 4th Generation warfare, distributed networks and leaderless
resistance, especially as will be practiced in the United States if it ever
goes to war with itself.
He is wrong, but the powerful men and women he is writing for think he's
right.
Unfortunately for them, in the situation the administration would find
itself after Waco
Two, the "decapitation" strategy would for them more resemble Russian
Roulette played with an automatic pistol.
Hypothetical: They kill some of (the Three Percent), at first
accidentally perhaps, but almost immediately thereafter intentionally. The
spasm of defensive killing begins, targeted at their leadership. They spasm in
return. They would not be able to scuttle into their "green zones"
fast enough. For each clumsy attack on (the Three Percent), they receive a
lesson in the 500 meter war, one bullet (or many bullets) at a time. They
commit "collateral damage" of our innocents, (the Three Percent)
stay(s) within the rules of engagement and kill only war-planners and
war-wagers.
I have asked this question before. They will fight to the last ATF agent
or to the last oath-breaking soldier. Will they fight to the first senior
bureaucrat, the second Congressman, the third newspaper editor, the fourth
Senator, the fifth White House aide? Can they stand Bill Clinton's rules of
engagement?
This is what 4GW means in an American civil war in the 21st Century. Can
you understand now why I am trying to get that “useful dire warning” out to as
many people as possible? Only if both sides understand the
possibility of bloody civil war can it be avoided.
“Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun." -- Mao
Tse-Tung, from Problems of War and Strategy (6 November 1938), Selected
Works, Vol. II, p. 224.
Which brings us to today.
Once again we hear demands for bans on semi-automatic rifles and for federal
control of all private transfers of all firearms (the so-called “gun show
loophole). This time, it is said, there will be no “grandfather clause”
of existing weapons and that confiscation of all military-pattern semi-auto
rifles is intended.
Yet the Three Percent will not obey such laws and they will defy the federal
government to do anything about it.
I was once told by a “gun safety” advocate back in the Nineties that he favored
total civilian firearms confiscation. Only the military and police should
have weapons he averred and what did I think about that? I began to give
him a reasoned answer and he cut me off with an abrupt, “Give me the short
answer.”
I thought for a moment and said, “If you try to take our firearms we will kill
you.”
It was true then, it is true now.
The “arbitrarians” believe that
they can continue to encroach upon the liberty and property of their fellow
Americans without consequence to them.
They cannot.
When democracy turns to tyranny, the armed citizen still gets to vote -- with
his rifle. Any grasping would-be tyrant who ignores that truth does so at
his or her own peril.
I pray, then, that Absolved is
viewed as a useful dire warning in time to prevent the Fourth Generation Civil
War it describes.
Salinas Nortenos gang members
