Praxis: Battle Drills

From Infantry Bugler, Fall 2012.

Battle Drills Still Critical: A Tale of Two Ambushes by Joseph Miller.

On a hot summer day, a small group of Rangers marched as the advanced guard of a logistical movement, when out of nowhere an ambush broke their formation. Their opponents were a group of local tribesmen led, trained and supplied by a cadre of well-trained military experts. Half the party of Rangers was instantly wounded, including their leader CPT Thomas McCulloch. Although extremely outnumbered, PVT Robert Lucas, without guidance, took the initiative and charged their opponents. In the action the two remaining Rangers were able to drive their adversaries away long enough for help to arrive, preventing the bodies of their comrades from being captured. This may sound like the latest Medal of Honor citation in the Global War on Terrorism, but it actually occurred in the summer of 182 on the Detroit and Ohio frontier. A comparison between the actions of Lucas and SSG Sal Giunta's similar ambush experience in the Korengal Valley of Kunar Province, Afghanistan in 2007 will indicate the viability of the system of battle drills that has been replaced by new doctrinal templates. When reacting to near ambushes, each soldier must take action in order to gain the most favorable outcome.

While Giunta's story is well-known, Lucas' account is buried in the archives of a forgotten conflict. Lucas journal was found, edited and published by John Parish in 1906. Far from providing the stereotypical 19th Century soldier standing in closed ranks on fixed battlefields, Lucas describes his service as a Ranger in the Ohio Militia. The term Ranger had various meanings in the early American Republic, but Lucas' references to covering long "ranges" by fatiguing marches referred to a company of men who usually performed as scouts and vanguard soldiers for the Ohio Militia. The War of 1812 is rife with dialogue about inept militiamen, but this ignores the fact that most of the weaker militia units came from Federalist states that opposed the war. The Ohio Militia was full of veterans of the war against Shawnee prophet Tecumseh.

The tenacity of the units was tested at Tippecanoe, and the Rangers were given the boldest tasks. The American fort at Detroit was situated far north and across the Detroit River from the British fort at Malden. This gave the British easy opportunities to harass American supply lines. Ambushes spearheaded by Shawnee and Wyandot tribesmen employed anything but conventional 19th-Century military tactics. On one of these ambushes, four Rangers served as the advanced guard when a group of tribesmen initiated an ambush on the small group. In the chaos, two of the Rangers were wounded. Despite being injured, their leader McCulloch ordered them into a line. Lucas moved forward with the other unwounded Ranger and they were able to push back the assaulting tribesmen. During the skirmish Lucas and McCulloch called for the forces behind them to form in a similar maneuver in order to defeat the entire enemy force, but the move was to no avail. In the chaos McCulloch was killed and scalped, but Lucas managed to secure his body to a plank and move it back to the larger American force. In utter chaos and with little chance of success, Lucas refused to leave his commander behind. Both of their actions rallied other soldiers during the chaos of a cataclysmic ambush, and although McCulloch died, his orders likely saved the rest of his men.

On the night of 25 October 3007, several days into a mission in the Korengal Valley, Giunta and his platoon were ambushed. The two lead men were hit immediately. When a third man was hit, Giunta plunged into the spray of bullets and pulled the man to safety, sustaining two bullet wounds. Giunta and the remaining men regrouped. They threw grenades, using the explosions to cover their forward movement until they reached one of the wounded men. Giunta pushed forward over a rise to see the other wounded soldier being carried away by the enemy. He leapt forward and fired, killing one insurgent and wounding the other. Giunta pulled his wounded friend to cover and worked to stop his bleeding until the MEDEVAC arrived and air support cleared the insurgents.

The similarity between these two ambushes illustrates the timelessness of strong battlefield tactics. On both occasions individuals who were highly outnumbered were able to fight off a superior enemy by quickly closing the distance between both forces. On both occasions the end results were somber American defeats, but the bodies of the fallen were recovered and returned to their families. In both instances individuals without orders were forced to take decisive action without guidance. The nature of the near ambush in Kunar very literally negates 200 years of technical and tactical development.

Battle drills were once standardized universal tactics for the entire Army, but they are now being replaced by unit-specific drills. This occurred because the enemy realized that our battle drills were rigid and dogmatic. Combat is hardly a place for dogma, but battle drills are required for situations where there is no time to deliberate command. When placed into a rapid actions, the youngest and most inexperienced soldiers may have to take the most critical actions. The desire to adapt to the changing nature of war is a positive impulse, but a true and long-term view of American military history illustrates the value of of rapid action to the point of instinct. Sebastian Junger's recent work, "War," about Afghanistan claims that instincts are primal and unlearned, but Junger is a reporter with little experience training men to act instinctively. Battle drills do just that. The universal battle drills outlined in the FM 7.8 provided framework for every unit. All units adapted the specific actions based on the enemy, their own weapons, level of training and equipment. Battle drills are for situations in which there is no time for deliberate decision-making. Using a checklist mentality to adapt to a field situation under fire that should allow for a deliberate decision-making process is a recipe for disaster, but battle drills were not designed for day-to-day actions. They were designed for situations so sire every soldier must act instinctively.

The new and positive impulse for adaptation should be balanced by a longer view of the nature of warfare. The newest (FM 3-21-8) Infantry doctrine is anything but simple and provides an outstanding framework for critical leader decision-making, but the older, more universally applied, and simple FM 7.8 more effectively prepared soldiers for the direst of situations in combat. A balanced approach to tactics within new and older methods allows for the newest innovations coupled with the wisdom of the entirety of the American military experience.